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ABSTRACT 
 
Who benefits from the proliferation of ecolodges, beachfront resorts, safari parks, river cruises, 
forest forays and other similar and increasingly popular ventures popping up in developing 
economies across the world? Critics hold that multinational hotel chains, influential tour 
operators and foreign interests sometimes in association with powerful domestic groups often 
engage in anticompetitive practices at the expense of local communities, domestic workers and 
other stakeholders where the tourism activities take place.In this paper, we examine the possibility 
of market power abuses in the tourism industry in small economies or small national economies.  
Many of these small economies have recently inaugurated antitrust enforcement agencies charged 
with curtailing market power abuses and other anticompetitive practices.  We also examine how 
effective these agencies are likely to be in challenging the powerful tourism industry. Succinctly, 
we conclude that monopsonistic practices may arise in the tourism sector of small economies. But 
we argue that domestic competition agencies are not suited to challenge monopsony for various 
reasons including a lack of political will.  We also analyze the plausible cartelization role of 
regional marketing boards.  Regional marketing boards are collaborative efforts by groups of 
countries.  Because it is entrusted with cross jurisdictional enforcement of competition laws, a 
“regional” agency with jurisdiction in several countries across a region may be more likely to 
successfully confront monopsony problems.  However, we conclude that a regional enforcement 
agency is equally unlikely to successfully challenged cross-border anticompetitive practices 
because it is not likely to challenge the impairment of consumer welfare of foreign nationals.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
lthough fears concerning terrorism and the safety of air travel and health concerns have dampened 
tourism demand the industry is anticipating a return to its double digit historical growth rates.  Travel 
and tourism activities accounted for a significant portion of the gross world product in 2000.  In 
2001, international tourist arrivals dipped; it has since recovered and is expected to reach an estimated 1.6 billion 
arrivals. 
 
The growth in tourism is partly a result of the removal of trade barriers and the erosion of restrictions on the 
flow of capital combined with the perception that tourism represents an alternative avenue for development.  In fact, 
various international lending agencies have embraced tourism and especially alternative tourism as a development 
strategy in poor nations.  This encouragement and active financing of alternative-tourism is driven by many factors, 
including the inability of traditional revenue-generating activities to provide sufficient jobs for growing populations 
and the assumption that alternative-tourism conveys manifold benefits: jobs, conservation and sustainable 
development
1
 
 
Critics have questioned who benefits from the proliferation of ecolodges, beachfront resorts, safari parks, 
                                                     
1 Middleton, Victor with Rebecca Hawkins. Sustainable Tourism: A Marketing Perspective (1998). Woburn Massachusetts: Butterworth-
Heinemann. 
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river cruises, forest forays and other similar ventures
2
.  In the Spring 2002 Barnett notes that tourism development 
worldwide has become ―so mis-shapen and skewed that itcan result in the poor getting poorer, the marginalized more 
marginalized, and the environment depleted.‖3   Barnett argues that multinational hotel chains, influential tour 
operators and foreign interests sometimes in association with powerful domestic groups often engage in 
anticompetitive practices at the expense of local communities and domestic workers, where the tourism activities take 
place. 
 
The development of tourism has benefited from the new era of reduced international restrictions to the flow of 
capital. The increase in trade has benefited nations considerably and allowed them to participate in the global 
economy. Tourism remains a key source of revenue for developing countries and in some instances, such as in the case 
of the small island nations, tourism accounts for sizable portions of their Gross Domestic Product.  However, precisely 
because of their modest size and influence, it is worthwhile examining whether small economy governments should be 
concerned with the potential for anticompetitive behavior on the part of the tourism industry.  Specifically, we examine 
whether there exists a potential for monopsonistic practices and collusive behavior.  In addition, we examine whether 
competition policy is capable of effectively negating anticompetitive behavior.  
 
Succinctly, we conclude that the threat of monopsonistic practices is real. The likelihood of collusion, either 
limited to national markets or across broader multi-nation markets is also likely.  The prosecution of these observed 
practices, however, is paradoxical.  Specifically, national competition agencies are unlikely to effectively challenge 
any anticompetitive practices in tourism destinations, largely because the political power wielded by major revenue 
generators is likely to neutralize the actions of the agency.  Regional collaboration between agencies or the formation 
of a regional agency with powers to enforce the law across regional jurisdictions could be more adept at thwarting 
pressure group’s lobbying influence.  Similarly, collaboration between operators within a region, ostensibly to marshal 
coordination of marketing campaigns could logically result in the possibility of price coordination across the regional 
tourist destinations.  But this practice does not necessarily result in direct reductions of domestic consumer welfare and 
therefore it is unlikely to be a target of any of the individual domestic agencies.   
 
E -Rise Of Liberalism And The Tourism Trade  
 
Small economies benefited considerably from the liberalization programs that swept the world over the last 
decade.  The adoption of liberalization policies entailed substantive political, social and regulatory and administrative 
changes across jurisdictions.  In many nations, the scope of reforms and implementation of market-driven policies 
resulted in economies radically different and distinct from the social, political and economic policies of the exiting old 
order.   
 
Reform ―packages‖ focused on deregulating economic policies in at least three broad areas, import, export, 
and domestic regulations. In particular, policies reduced import duties and in some instances eliminated them 
altogether, simplified import procedures and facilitated exports.  Importantly, changes resulted in lessened restrictions 
and enhanced guarantees on foreign investment.  The less onerous restrictions and the implicit and explicit protections 
offered by international guarantor agencies and by multilateral organizations led to an infusion of foreign investments 
in any number of sectors including resorts and other tourism-related developments.   
 
Seeking to capitalize on demand for ―unspoiled‖ natural gems, funding of tourism destinations increased 
relative to historical levels of investment especially among the smaller economies.
4
  In a number of instances the 
investment focused in heretofore isolated regions, detached economically and geographically removed from the 
centers of power in any given country.  This expenditure proved beneficial to many.  The former backward regions 
                                                     
2 Costas, Jorge and Gavin Eccles., ―Hospitality and Tourism Impacts: An Industry Perspective,‖ International Journal of Contemporary 
Hospitality Management, Volume 8, No. 7 (1996); Chandana Jayawardena., ―Mastering Caribbean Tourism,‖ International Journal of 
Contemporary Hospitality Management, Volume 14, No. 2 (2002). 
3 Mastny, Lisa. ―Ecotourist Trap,‖ Foreign Policy (November/December 2002).  
4 Dieke, Peter.  ―Tourism in Africa’s Economic Development: Policy Implications‖, Management Decision, Volume 41, No. 3 (2003) 
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boomed with tourism and ancillary investments resulting in considerable revenues for the home country derived 
directly from tourism and from associated linkages.  Table 1, below, conveys the increased dependence of the smaller 
economies on the tourism trade. 
 
 
Table 1 
       
Rank Country Description Amount    
1 San Marino 19185 per 1000 people 
 
 
 
  
2 Monaco 8,097.04 per 1000 people 
 
 
 
  
3 Palau 3,812.66 per 1000 people    
4 Antigua and Barbuda 3,439.69 per 1000 people 
 
  
5 Malta 2,794.98 per 1000 people    
6 Cyprus 2,721.18 per 1000 people  
 
  
7 Saint Kitts and Nevis 2,271.79 per 1000 people 
 
  
8 Liechtenstein 1,735.58 per 1000 people    
9 Luxembourg 1,718.8 per 1000 people    
10 Hungary 1,711.96 per 1000 people    
11 Barbados 1,706.39 per 1000 people    
12 Czech Republic 1,640.86 per 1000 people  
 
  
13 Seychelles 1,623.01 per 1000 people    
14 Saint Lucia 1,548.6 per 1000 people    
15 Singapore 1,466.74 per 1000 people    
16 Ireland 1,431.05 per 1000 people    
17 Grenada 1,244.24 per 1000 people    
18 Maldives 1,143.16 per 1000 people    
19 France 1,126.23 per 1000 people    
20 Spain 1,079.22 per 1000 people    
 Total 163.27 million    
 Weighted Avg 1,243.76 per 1000 people    
 
Source: United Nations World Statistics Pocketbook  
              and Statistical Yearbook   
 
 
 
 Not surprisingly, given increased dependence on tourism commentators raised concern over prospective 
abuses of the concentrations of tourism related capital.
5
  While there are many condemnable issues proffered our focus 
here is on those complaints about prospective abuses of market power.   
 
 
 
 
                                                     
5 Mastny, Lisa., ―Traveling Light: New Paths for International Tourism,‖  Worldwatch Paper No. 159 (December 2001). 
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In this paper, we analyze two likely avenues through which the marshalling of market power may impair 
competition.  First, we address the plausible emergence of monopsony amidst the tourism destinations.  Second, we 
also discuss the efforts between the various hotel and resort operators present in a region to secure cooperation in joint 
advertising programs; cooperation that may spill into limits on vigorous regional competition. 
 
The Presence Of Monopsonistic Practices 
 
It might seem perplexing to highlight the gains derived from increased international trade as we do above and 
then proceed to question whether anticompetitive practices have emerged as a result of trade.  In fact, it has been 
argued repeatedly that the best remedy for anticompetitive practices is free and unfettered trade, a remedy even more 
applicable and salutary in small economies.  However, there have been any number of researchers who have carefully 
examined small economies and concluded that there are exclusive attributes of small economies that render them 
immune to the benefits of increased trade.
6
  For example, trade has little impact on non-tradables. Key participants in 
local markets are likely to have historically accumulated market power preserved by regulatory and tariff barriers 
placed by friendly governments. In principle, the undoing of regulatory barriers to entry of the new free-market regime 
will result in domestic challenges that will beget competition.  In reality, the power and influence of entrenched power 
groups is unlikely to abate with regulatory changes.   
 
Another key proposition of free-trade skeptics is that small economies can support fewer firms.  Logically, 
only a few firms are capable of achieving the minimum efficient scale in a small economy given the modest levels of 
demand.
7
  The conventional counterargument points out that eliminating tariffs and other barriers to trade naturally 
leads to broader geographic markets and the potential for growth at the same time as consumers gain from the resulting 
lower prices and increased choice.  Therefore, the small-economy firms can enter the much larger geographic market 
that resulted from open borders and proceed to compete vigorously.  But to achieve the larger optimal scale associated 
with the now broader geographic market requires time and capital.  Because the small economy firm has its domestic 
constituency, it typically finds it less onerous to protect itself and lobby for non-tariff barriers or any similar 
protectionist measure rather than compete.    
 
It is not inconceivable amidst the isolation characterizing the locations that the financial groups underwriting 
the economic development of the tourism destination are able to exert considerable market power in purchasing inputs 
from local suppliers.  In this context, the likelihood of entrenched and powerful groups may support anticompetitive 
policies.  That is, to the extent that an insulated, economically affluent group establishes a position of being the largest 
employer and purchaser in a regional and isolated economy with no significant competition, the possibility of 
monopsony power arises.  A firm is said to be a monopsonist if it faces upward sloping supply curves for labor and for 
inputs and therefore have market power that enables them to set input prices.  Therefore, with increased trade raising 
exposure to external risk, and domestic labor groups increasing their demands for government protection and 
assistance, the social consensus between labor, government and the private sector that brought about trade reforms 
may erode, reversing all trade and deregulatory efforts.
8 
 A likely outcome is that the net result of the lobbying aimed 
at thwarting competitive efforts are reduced and equated to politically spheres of influence.    
 
The Likelihood Of Regional Cartelization  
 
Competing in a world market for international tourism dollars often pits one region versus another.  Thus, one 
finds Caribbean resort operators competing against those in the Mediteranean.  There is a certain logic and 
procompetitive incentive to the formation of regional destination marketing organizations (DMOs) and other 
collaborative efforts such as the Caribbean Tourism Organization or the European Travel Commission.  These entities 
                                                     
6 Briguglio, Lino and John Kaminarides (Eds.). Islands and small States: Issues and Policies", In a special Issue of World Development, (1993). 
Lino New York: Pergamon Press; Michal S. Gal, ―Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition Policy,‖ University of 
Southern California Law Review, (2001). 
7 Boza, Beatriz., ―Small Economies and Competition Policy: A Background Paper,‖ OECD Global Forum on Competition, 
CCNM/GF/COMP(2003)4 (February 2003). 
8 Rodrik, Dani, ―Trade, Social Insurance, and the Limits to Globalization,‖ No 5905, NBER Working Papers. 
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often seek to increase visitation through a unified marketing campaign promoting the entire region.  Simultaneously, 
individual firms, destinations within the region, provinces (or states) and national concerns fund advertisements 
intended to take market share from the regional competitors while at the same time serving to expand the market. 
 
Is the DMO likely to translate into a collaboration that would allow erstwhile competitors to characterize the 
nature of competition?  For example, it is theoretically possible that such collaboration could result in defining the 
nature of competition to eliminate aggressive campaigns that reduce the effective price for the service.  Such a cartel 
would face intense competition from other regions and individual operators, and considerable pressure from large tour 
operators, airlines and other large market savvy buyers.  However, if the DMO is successful, another possible outcome 
could be higher prices to prospective customers with an associated reduction in the number of arrivals.  
 
Is a domestic competition authority likely to successfully challenge these practices?  For the most part, the 
recently inaugurated competition agencies of the world incorporate the notion of domestic consumer welfare as their 
guiding paradigm.  If DMOs capable of exerting some price discipline on intra-regional arrivals guard against 
affecting domestic travel by careful price discrimination, the reduction of consumer welfare will not impair domestic 
competition directly.  To the contrary, the price discipline is likely to result in substantially higher revenues to the host 
countries, rendering authorities unlikely to marshal the political will necessary to challenge the anticompetitive 
practices, even if it were possible. 
 
The Adoption Of Competition Policies 
 
Over the last 15 years, the number of nations that have adopted or are contemplating adoption of a 
competition policy program has grown exponentially. In a paper published in 1998, Mark Palim observed that ―as of 
the end of 1996, seventy countries had their own competition law.‖9   
 
The adoption of competition policy has been for the most part a developed country conceit.  It is unlikely that 
a small open economy would be susceptible to market power abuses.  The disciplining effects of trade and unfettered 
competition suffice are likely to prevent most known abuses of market power.  However, there are several 
commentators who point to particular characteristics of small economies that effectively separate them from the impact 
of broader trade disciplining effects.
10
   
 
These commentators argue that trade policy alone cannot or does not remove all barriers to trade. For 
example, liberal trade policies cannot erode language differences, where language is an important part of the product 
(e.g., computer keyboards). Trade barriers also may result from geographic boundaries (e.g., maritime borders, high 
mountain chains, or secluded areas) that create high transportation costs. Transportation or adaptation costs affect 
trade levels, especially where low price, high shipment costs, or perishable products are involved. Trade is also limited 
where producers must be in close proximity to the ultimate consumers (e.g., service industries). Political conditions 
may also influence trade levels— accentuating geographic isolation both by closing certain passages to trade and by 
preventing trade between adjacent jurisdictions. 
 
Tariffs, limited convertibility of currencies and transfer of credits, and a central authority’s standardization of 
consumer choice also create trade barriers. Moreover, trade levels are affected by domestic laws and regulations, such 
as those regulating environmental liability and intellectual property rights. Trade intensity may also be affected by 
entry barriers that face domestic and foreign producers alike, such as brand name recognition. Accordingly, where 
significant natural or artificial barriers to trade exist, the size of the domestic population and its dispersion significantly 
influence the economic conditions of the market. 
                                                     
9 Palim, Mark., ―The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law: An Empirical Analysis,‖ The Antitrust Bulletin (Spring 1998).   
10 Gal, Michal S., ―Size Does Matter: The Effects of Market Size on Optimal Competition Policy,‖ University of Southern 
California Law Review, (2001). 
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The Limits Of Competition Policy 
 
The Case Of Monopsony 
 
By definition, late adopters of competition policy regimes lack many of the prerequisites underscoring 
successful competition program and at the same time are afflicted by many others that ensure the fundamental 
weakness of any prospective program.   
 
The smaller economies lack the historical aversion to ―bigness‖ found elsewhere. The smaller economies lack 
the jurisprudence and legal foundation within which to place the legal framework required to successfully operate a 
competition policy.  Because they proceed for the most part from technocratic initiatives often perceived to be result of 
conditionality, the incipient competition agencies lack the political and social constituency necessary to avidly 
challenge the competitive practices of powerful interest groups. 
 
Most small economies suffer a close coordination between their national firms and their governments, 
offering meager prospects that a government agency would serve as a vehicle to possibly impair the fortunes of their 
national champions.  Dedicating resources to traditional competition law enforcement may simply encourage producer 
interest groups to lobby other government agencies and officials for protection from the enforcement agencies.  A 
formal model of this structure of incentive can be found in Rodriguez & Williams (1994, 1995).
11
 
 
The Case of Marketing Boards 
 
Marketing boards are implemented to pro-competitively enhance the market.  Because of the high cost of 
advertising internationally, there are many gains to collaborative efforts to the various competitors in a region.  Thus, 
often in association with national trade ministries, the marketing boards offer a ready made, well financed and 
functional framework to extent the marketing collaboration into monitoring competitive practices.  The resulting 
structure is effectively a cartel that transcends national borders and directs its impact at tourists arriving from abroad. 
 
Given that the impact of reduced price competition falls on residents of foreign countries, a domestic agency, 
charged with securing the consumer welfare of its nationals is unlikely to find the political will to challenge the 
marketing board’s practices. 
 
International collaboration between competition agencies has been proposed throughout the years.
12
  The 
debate appears to have heightened lately with numerous initiatives presently in motion.  A regional agency or a 
multilateral action appears to be the ideal institution to proscribe an international cartel practice.  In reality the 
prospects of such international collaboration between agencies appears to be but a gleam in several commentators eyes 
despite significant support and lobbying from various quarters.  
 
If the domestic agencies are not up to the task will the more experienced agencies of the European Union and 
the United States adequately police the industry?  In our opinion, this would only happen by coincidence.  In recent 
actions against tourism and hospitality industry operators the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the European 
Commission failed to consider whether there would be any anticompetitive impact on the host nations.  The FTC 
recently closed its investigation of two proposed acquisitions involving the three largest firms in the ocean cruise 
industry. The largest firm (Carnival Corp.) and the second largest firm (Royal Caribbean Cruises) had been battling to 
acquire the industry's third largest firm (P&O Princess Cruises).   The FTC examined three possible anticompetitive 
                                                     
11 Rodriguez, A.E. & Mark D. Williams., ―The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for Developing Countries,‖ North Carolina Journal 
of International Law & Commercial Regulation, Volume 19 (1994);  A.E. Rodriguez & M.D. Williams., ―Economic Liberalization and Antitrust 
in Mexico,‖ Revista de Analisis Economico, Volumen 10, No.2 (Noviembre de 1995).  
12 Waller, Spence Weber, ―The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement,‖ Boston University Law Review, Volume 77, Number 2 (April 
1997); Spencer Weber Waller, ―National Laws and International Markets: Strategies of Cooperation and Harmonization in the Enforcement of 
Competition Laws,‖ Cardozo Law Review, Volume 18, Number 3 (December 1996).  
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theories in the matter: (1) unilateral effects whereby a single firm takes advantage of its large size or its product niche 
to extract a price increase by itself; (2) the likelihood of coordinated interactions among the reduced number of firms – 
post-merger- resulting in higher prices for a substantial percentage of customers; and (3) strategic behavior that might 
increase entry barriers and/or disadvantage rivals, reducing overall competition in the industry.
13
  
 
In September 1999, the European Commission blocked the hostile acquisition of First Choice by Airtours 
because the transaction would have created a three-firm dominant position in the market for short-haul package 
holidays in the United Kingdom. In June 2002, the Court of First Instance annulled the Commission decision.
14
 The 
anticompetitive theory of joint dominance is similar to the coordinated interaction theory considered by the by the 
FTC; an assessment of the likelihood of tacit-coordination by market participants after the merger.   The Commission 
did not examine whether there would be any impact on the host nations.   
 
Although it may be possible for anticompetitive behavior to affect host-nation citizens, neither the FTC nor 
the European Commission specifically considered this possibility as part of their respective investigations.  Thus, it is 
unlikely that small nation states can look for relief from foreign competition enforcement agencies. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Critics hold that multinational hotel chains, influential tour operators and foreign interests sometimes in 
association with powerful domestic groups often engage in anticompetitive practices at the expense of local 
communities, domestic workers, where the tourism activities take place.  In this paper, we reviewed the prospects of 
market power abuses in the tourism industry and assess the prospects of the novel regulatory regimes currently being 
implemented to address these concerns.  We conclude that monopsonistic practices may arise within tourism 
destinations. But domestic competition agencies are not suited to challenge monopsony for various reasons.  An 
important reason is that the agencies are typically small, under-funded and they lack a political and social base that 
would support the agency in any action against the politically powerful domestic economic groups usually associated 
with the hotel & tourism operators.  Put differently, they lack the political will to go against any of the powerful 
groups. 
 
We also note well financed pro-competitive regional marketing boards presently active in any number of 
regions may effectively act as a cartel coordinator of the various hotel and resort operators that constitute the cartel.  
The boards can ensure no anticompetitive pricing affects the domestic tourism trade by carefully devising and 
designing price discrimination schemes.  Any domestic antitrust agency would find challenging the marketing board 
cartel contrary to its stated objective of safeguarding the consumer welfare of its domestic citizens.   
 
A ―regional‖ agency with jurisdiction in several countries across a region may be more likely to successfully 
confront the marketing board.  However, the same vulnerability to lobby groups impairs the effectiveness and likely 
prospects of success.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
NOTES 
                                                     
13 Grimes, Warren & John Kwoka., ―A Study in Merger Enforcement Transparency: The FTC’s Ocean Cruise Decision and the Presumption 
Governing High Concentration Mergers,‖ Antitrust Source, May 2003, available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/source/may03/metstudy.pdf. 
14 Airtours v. Commission, European Court of First Instance, Case T-342/99, [2002] ECR II-2585 (2002).  
